Blogue/Blog:

Commentaires qui invitent à la réflexion sur l’actualité politique, en français ou en anglais / Thought-provoking comments on political developments, in English or French

2003/11/07

On How to Avoid Moral Dilemmas in Politics

(Wonkish. Paper written for a course on ethics at Harvard)
First of all, let me state up front that I believe many leaders and politicians have had “to learn how not to be good” (Machiavelli, The Prince), and then done wrong, in order to succeed in their respective fields or situations. This however does not imply by any means that such leaders were faced with equally compelling moral choices, nor that they chose wisely.


Let me also say that I can see myself in such a position, being forced to chose between two morally compelling options. And I can honestly say that I would fight tooth and nail to find a way out of such a moral dilemma, in order not to do something wrong, as you will see with my analysis of the cases below.

I hope through this small and rather unrefined contribution clarify my own views on the matter, as well as offer others some additional guidelines that may help in the hard choices we may one day have to make (should I post it). Hopefully the rationales proposed here to justify choices will not simply be the product of an exercise in intellectual trickery, but rather have some usable moral basis on which make judgments.

Machiavelli

Before we turn to the cases, let us briefly discuss the original position, from which the paradox of dirty hands first emerged, that is the one described in Machiavelli’s book, The Prince. It seems to me fairly obvious, upon reading only the assigned chapters, that he was attempting to provide the hereditary ruler of Florence with what he wanted to hear (dictators often like that) or to provoke this presumably good but soft ruler into action.

In any case the leader is not faced, in my opinion, with a real moral dilemma. Either Italians are really being abused or subjugated by foreign armies, in which case self-defense and self-determination can be invoked (and force used as a last resort), or it is not the case and the true justification is to satiate the Italians’ “appetite for revenge”, and because “everyone is sick of being pushed around by the barbarians”, not a particularly moral position! (Both quotes are from the last paragraph of The Prince).

A leader may be pushed against his better judgment to go to war for the latter reasons, but then it is hardly a competition between two morally compelling options: war and peace. The only moral dilemma here, if I can say that, is between doing the right thing and doing the wrong thing, and if the leader chooses to do wrong by choosing wrong, he should feel guilty and be left with a good deal of moral residue all over his red face! If not… his soul.

Guiding Principles

In a similar vein, I did not find in any of the five cases* presented to us, including the mini-cases, any authentic moral dilemmas. All these cases, in my opinion, could have been readily resolved because of the alternatives available, the self-serving nature of the “wrong” option, or another principle that is not fulfilled, from the Checklist of Questions on Dirty Hands (passed out in class).

I will nevertheless explain my position on the most clear cut cases of moral dilemmas among these five cases, but will do so in a different way. The two cases I have chosen, Walzer’s torture case and President Truman’s use of the atomic bomb, are also in my view the most pertinent in the present global context, and have potentially the gravest of consequences.

The two cases will be analyzed not by discussing the pros and cons of the arguments presented in class or in the readings, which we have already done to a certain extent, but rather by looking at them through a set of additional or extended guiding principles that I use in analyzing such cases. Some of these have been touched upon in class and/or in the readings, yet were not fully developed, while others are new as far as I can tell.

1. The False Debates

The most important of these and whose repercussions I’ve often faced in my line of work is question 6 on the Checklist – “Did I get into this situation because I failed to anticipate it properly?”  Or, to expand it, “Did I (we) fail to do all that I (we) could to prevent this situation from occurring?”

All too often we are placed before competing and exclusionary options, when we know very well that we were, to various degrees, co-responsible for the deterioration of the situation that fostered the paradox that developed, by our actions or inaction. That is why some in opposition, for example, to the conduct of the present war on terrorism, see the choice between this war and terrorism as a false debate. Rather, the debate should be about the living conditions of millions of fellow human beings, which are exploited by the present vogue of terrorists (like Hitler and others have done in the past), and the reasons for these conditions, and how to change them. The real debate should be about the choice between continuing along the same path or fixing the problem. There should not be any moral dilemmas between these two options.

In the torture case, such an approach would translate into an analysis of what caused the terrorist to act as he did. The purpose of which is to understand, not to justify. Also could or should we have rectified the causal injustice (not because a terrorist said it was wrong but because it is wrong). In the Truman case, we would need to look at what colonial powers had done in East Asia and the East Indies, or not done, to secure a viable peace with Japan (the same with Germany after the Great War, for that matter).

Yet because it does not help us much to think in these terms at the very moment that one must make a decision between two morally-compelling options, irrespective of how you got to that point, let us move on.

2. Means and Ends

The second principle that guides my analysis and decision, when faced with a course of action that is being judged or advocated in terms of “the ends justifying the means”, can be summed up as: “The means are ends in the making” (from the War Resister’s League, N.Y.C.). This is the basis for non-violent action. By choosing to torture or to commit mass murder, you may not only achieve your ends, but you have altered those ends, perhaps permanently.

There is little doubt in my mind that the use of the A-bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki devalued not only America, but also humanity as a whole. Irrespective of any future use and proliferation of nuclear weapons, that is discounting the slippery slope argument, human beings, individually and collectively, are less because of this act of creation, development and use of weapons of mass destruction. The end in this case, the safeguard of our way of life, which can be summed up in the concept of democracy broadly defined, has been altered for the worse.

By the same token, the use of torture devalues the democracy for which we stand. And the type of society you will end up with will be less than it was. The end that you hold dearest has been altered by your own actions. This argument, in my view, goes beyond the “basic decency” argument made by E. Anscombe, and the “slippery slope” argument, as I have indeed drew a line before its cress.

It would be somewhat ironic, if it wasn’t so sad, that many have died among us and for us in the past to safeguard our liberties and democracy, that many today are prepared to do the same, and that some are presently dying for the same cause, yet we are quite prepared to abandon some of our liberties and democracy, with little resistance, in order to possibly save some lives.

3. Common Morality

I have grave difficulty with referring to “common morality”, as A. Donagan states it, in order to justify ones choice in these matters. How is common morality defined? Does it only contain the opinion and interests of the majority (which I will call popular morality), or does it also include the protection of minority rights, as well as legal rights? When the President of the United States swears to uphold the U.S. Constitution in his oath of office, s/he swears to also uphold its incorporated Bill of Rights. S/he must therefore explicitly defend the rights of minorities, as well as defendants’ legal rights. However, under fire from a majority seeking “revenge” or other wrong, s/he may find it difficult to resist, especially if election are coming up or a mob is standing outside.

I would argue that popular morality used to include the acceptance of slavery and segregation, for example, and is not entirely noble today either. Particularly since it only includes the interests of nationals. Which brings me to my second question: Who defines common morality?

In the Hiroshima-Nagasaki case, it is undeniable that revenge and a dehumanization of Orientals in general, and the Japanese in particular, played a role in the common acceptance of the use of the A-bombs to kill a massive number of civilians and end the war. Yet the opinions of foreign citizens, in this case Asians, were not taken into account, although they were the first to bear the brunt of the choice President Truman made.

Rights and human value does not hold only for one’s own citizens. They do not end at one’s own border. In studying or taking a decision regarding competing moral choices of action, one of the principles which I use is thus this: that all women and men are created equal on this planet, and that they have unalienable rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Not to mention those contained in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other such covenants that our national governments have signed and ratified.

It is not that the paradox of dirty hands is only apparent, when using national or popular common morality to set the rules. Instead I say that it is the lack of a paradox that is only apparent.

4. The Slippery Slope Extended

The main slippery-slope argument, as presented by R. Duorkin and which leads us to spare the terrorist from torture, is that the misdeed (torture) may set a precedent or model which others, less good decision-makers, may follow.

I would argue two points. The first is that it is equally depressing to think that not only worst leaders may do likewise but that good leaders may repeat this act repeatedly, under similar or different extraordinary circumstances. Also, the “model” may henceforth contain far more than torture in its toolkit. If torture is permitted, why not lying, the falsification of evidence, and fraud, to name but a few, which arguably are less drastic than torture? And what is to keep our model from eventually containing more drastic measures, such as murder, assassination, and a host of other deplorable measures to attain an end. Indeed the stop-line is hard to draw. A slippery slope indeed…

Equally important, if not more so, by torturing the presumed terrorist and a number of others (these things are rarely done in ones), you may unleash more terrorist attacks (if this indeed is not a singular incident). You have given your opponent one more reason to despise you and to convince others of your immorality, especially if your reaction to the terrorist attack is to inflict disproportionate retaliation on your enemies, with unfortunate civilian casualties.

In effect, by choosing to save the lives of the apartment dwellers, in our case, you may put in danger the lives of many more civilians, perhaps as much as if you had caved in to the terrorist(s)’ demands.

An alternative path would have you fix some of the deep underlying problems that may have contributed to this opposition, such as poverty, inequality, a lack of education (especially civic education) and opportunity, lingering conflicts, and poor governance. It is not a guarantee against terrorism, but it is the only solution that has ever succeeded in the world over the long term.

It is not because a terrorist has perhaps pointed out some of these wrongs that you must rectify them, but because they are wrong to you as well.

A last word

I tried in this paper to extend the principles we need to use to guide us in judging the relative value of different morally-compelling courses of action. It is my hope that these will assist practitioners in making the right choice, and thus avoid having to do wrong.

A leader may very well have to do wrong in order to do good… but perhaps she or he does not.


Notes:

*(1) Walzer’s candidate for election, (2) Walzer’s terrorism-torture case, (3) Truman’s use of the A-bomb, (4) the lying-deceitful mini-cases, and (5) the “good” commissioner case.