Ten Key Insights Into The 2015 Federal Election

(Wonkish)

10. A weaker NDP than polls depicted from the very beginning

Before and during the first half of the election campaign, nearly all opinion polls placed the NDP in first place across Canada. This was particularly deceiving given their huge advance in Quebec where they were polling between 43% and 52%. In reality they were much weaker in the other provinces and territories except for B.C. Even within many of the provinces, the overall provincial scores were misleading, with close battles in and around major cities and some rural ridings.

Once their Quebec support began to erode after the Duffy trial and their pledge not to stimulate the economy and run deficits on August 24^th, their unique-selling-point (to use marketing jargon), that they were the best placed party to defeat Prime Minister Harper’s Conservatives, also started to whither and then completely disintegrate when their Quebec support tanked following the niqab controversy. Their losses in QC were divvied up between the BQ, CPC and LPC, with the latter picking up the mantle of dragon (a.k.a. dinosaur?) slayer.

From that moment on, the Trudeau Liberals began to pull in all the middle-class, get-rid-of-Harper, we-want-change-above-all-else and ABC vote away from the New Democrats who never recovered. Arguing over the last weeks of the campaign that the NDP only needed to win some 40 extra seats to form a minority government, whereas the LPC needed to win more than 100, based on the seat count at the time the writ was dropped, sounded hollow given they were now polling less than 25% with seat projections at or below 80 while the Liberals were already in minority territory, polling at 33% and climbing with seats projected at 120 or more.

9. Did Quebec give the Liberals their majority?

The surge in Liberal support commenced with a better-than-expected rise in the popular vote in Atlantic Canada that then swept across the country from East to West, and circling North in between, like a human wave around a stadium. Every region can thus lay claim to having given Mr. Trudeau the extra seats he won to form a majority government.

However the largest number of extra ridings won by the Grits relative to the last week’s seat projections by Eric Grenier’s Poll Tacker (of ThreeHundredEight.com) was in Quebec in absolute numbers. The numbers are even more impressive when compared to those projected two before the vote, as a percentage of extra ridings won per total provincial ridings.

Why did the Liberals win so many unexpected seats in Quebec? While their share of the popular vote in the province rose among Anglophones and Allophones, it also rose substantially among Francophones, although to a lesser degree (27% among Francophones according to the last Léger survey a week before and 35% overall). For example, in the bellwether and mainly Francophone riding of Saint-Jean near Montreal where I ran the last time, the Liberals won the riding with 33% of the vote this time around (the NDP got 29%, the BQ 25% & the CPC 11%).

Once many French-speaking voters had transited from the sovereignist BQ to the federalist NDP in 2011, a harder transition to contemplate, it was somewhat easier for some of them to then move from the NDP to the equally (if not stauncher) federalist LPC in order to defeat PMSH, instead of returning to the Bloc or going to the Conservatives.

This allowed for many close two-, three- and even four-way races between the main political parties in the province. Other than the Quebec City area where the CPC was relatively stronger, much of the Quebec nationalist vote split between the BQ and the NDP (as seen in Saint-Jean), allowing the LPC to come out on top, in a similar way that Conservatives won many extra ridings in the GTA in 2011 when the vote split between the Libs and the Dips.

That may not happen again in 2019, but then again many things can change between now and the next election. Nevertheless the Grits would do well to try and build greater support among Francophones in Quebec. There are a number of things the party can do to achieve this without going the NDP route to the Sherbrooke Declaration.

8. Due to the niqab, the Block, the Cons &… the Libs made gains in Quebec

The BQ and the CPC were both heading for a resounding defeat in Quebec, with projections granting each of them two or less seats (i.e. worst than their respective 2011 scores), until PMSH introduced the niqab issue. Both the prime minister and Mr. Duceppe had come out against Premier Pauline Marois’ much more severe Charter of Values in 2013-2014, but both now jumped at the opportunity of linking their opposition to the niqab at citizenship swearing-in ceremonies to the Quebec Liberal Party’s so-called religious neutrality bill banning faith-based (i.e. Muslim) face coverings when giving or receiving public services, Bill-62. 

Although the support for a ban on face coverings during the public pronunciation of the citizenship oath was strongest in Quebec for various reasons (equality rights, support for France’s alternative concept of citizenship, opposition to religious extremism generally, or islamophobia), ban support was still upwards of 70% across the country. Nevertheless, the issue had the effect of raising both Conservative and Bloc support, and depressing mostly the NDP vote, allowing Tories to win 12 seats and the Bloc 10 by sneaking by in tightly contested, primarily Francophone ridings, even with slightly lower percentages of the popular vote than in 2011.

However in so doing, Harper unwittingly insured that the vote would split between four parties, which allowed the Liberals in the end to gain the extra 20+ seats they need to put them over the 170-seat threshold to form a majority government.

7. What Conservative ballot box bonus and greater electoral efficiency?

Contrary to expectations, the Tories did not benefit from any ballot box bonus on Election Day, where proportionately more of their supporters were purported to withhold stating their true voting intentions to pollsters, thus providing a boost of anywhere between 2-5% once the votes were counted. With 31.9% on voting day, they ended up within the range of the last ten polls conducted over the last week of campaigning, between 30% and 32.6%.

Additionally, they were supposed to win more seats per vote casted than the opposition due to their greater strength in less-populated rural ridings. In fact the Liberals turned out to be the most efficient on that score, winning 184 ridings with 37.7K votes on average while the Conservatives won their 99 seats with 56.5K average votes.

Compared to the CPC in 2011, the LPC won a slightly greater percentage of seats (54.4% of 338 seats in 2015 for the Libs vs. 53.9% of 308 seats in 2011 for the Cons) with a slightly lesser share of the popular vote (39.5% vs. 39.6% for the CPC in 2011).

This was due in good measure to the Tories winning their 99 ridings with larger margins than the Liberals who more often fought and won close competitive races, thus needing less votes to win these ridings.

6. From 65^th to 57^th in the world ranking of women in lower houses of parliament

With 26% (88/338) Canada moved up to the 57^th spot in the percentage of women members of parliament in the world, from 65^th place with 24.7% (76/308) obtained in 2011.

We are still surpassed by 21 European, 16 Sub-Saharan African, 9 Central and South American, 5 Asian, 3 Middle Eastern and North African, and 2 Oceanian countries. Examples: Rwanda 64%, Bolivia 53%, Sweden 44%, Senegal 43%, Mexico 42%, Argentina 36%, Sudan & Tunisia 31%, Afghanistan 28% and Iraq 26.5%.

Here’s hoping that the democratic and electoral reforms the Liberals promised will be able to address and rectify this abomination.

Source: http://www.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. Note that this ranking doesn't add countries with the same proportion, so ranks Canada 50th based on 77/304 (sic) seats in the House of Commons.

5. Personal attacks don’t always work –  here’s why

Negative ads don’t work nearly as well if they are proven or shown to be untrue or if they are confronted effectively or not allowed to linger unopposed (Dion and Ignatieff campaigns in Canada, just like Dukakis and Kerry in the U.S., failed in that respect).

One of the reasons the Harper Conservatives started to broadcast negative ads the day after Mr. Trudeau’s election as party leader on April 14, 2013 was to define him before he had a chance to define himself. They were already denouncing him from the moment he announced his candidacy and in fact even began to play paid TV ads against Mr. Mulcair during his own leadership bid.

They do so because it is much easier to convince someone of something before they have an opinion, than it is to make them change their minds after they have one. Sometimes “it takes dynamite to change someone’s opinion,” as one American pundit once put it.

However, in Mr. Trudeau’s case, those early personal attack ads backfired for two related reasons. The Tories looked like bullies, as others have pointed out, and in my view because Harper was attacking “Justin”, pretty well Canada’s adopted son regardless of their feelings towards his father. A good segment of the population had seen him on their own living room television set grow up at 24 Sussex Dr., gone through family joys and tribulations, confront separatists in college, deliver a moving eulogy at his father’s funeral, visit their communities in his formative years, and even turn his back on elected public office. They had to pull the ads off the air, since they were more damaging to them than Mr. Trudeau, and helping him to remain well in the lead in national polls.

The second wave of personal attack ads, the subtler “Just not ready” ones, were eventually more effective because, after having been given the chance to show substance for two years, the party failed to do so to a sufficient level. There were a few op-ed pieces published under his name, to which plagiarism charges were levelled, and more effectively the odd substantive speech (e.g. his economic one in front of the Vancouver Board of Trade), but these were too seldom to change the perception that there was little there, as numerous critiques alleged. Instead we were hearing far too many speeches and talk show appearances filled with feel-good generalities, but without the Obama-esque oratory, so that they came out to many as a string of platitudes.

Was this due to a strategy bent on keeping the party’s policy powder dry until the election and expectations low, since they remained in the lead regardless? Or were they simply not ready to announce any formulated policies that the opposition would surely attack regardless of their worth?

Either way, they did take two defining positions in the year preceding the election that hurt them badly and, with little else to show, seemed to confirm the content of those new attack ads and sent the party into third place. I’m talking obviously of the combat mission against ISIL and the anti-terrorism bill C-51. Not that you couldn’t make a reasonable case to back both of them up, as a number of scholars and experts have done, but you would have needed to do so with a much more robust strategy that included well reasoned and easy to understand counterarguments, backed by leading experts and allies.

The party belatedly began to present a number of detailed policy proposals to offset the impression left behind, such as the new universal child care benefit program, but many saw it as unfortunately too little too late.

What saved the Liberals, as many analysts have pointed out, were Mr. Trudeau’s impeccable performance throughout the campaign (especially during the five debates and countless news conferences), the party’s far better overall strategy, its bold policies to actually do something about the present state of country’s economy and people’s standard of living, among other concerns, and its flawless execution.

In fact Canadians should have seen it coming, given how well Mr. Trudeau performed when well prepared, such as the inaugural speech he delivered launching his bid for the leadership of the LPC in the fall of 2011 or the presentation of his party’s universal chid care benefit program in the spring of 2015, or if you prefer his boxing match with former senator Patrick Brazeau.

That is, the personal attack ads against Mr. Trudeau and the Liberals in general were finally shown to be demonstrably false, and every time they were replayed past that point, they reinforced the message at least among those who paid attention that indeed “He was in fact ready!”

4. Fear mongering doesn’t necessarily work either

The airwaves were inundated with paid advertisements and reports of the leaders’ speeches spreading fear of their opponents, especially over the last two weeks of the campaign in a desperate move not to win the election, but to save as many seats as possible and avert disaster. When few are buying what you are selling, and you can’t come up with a new product in time, the only recourse seems to be to denigrate the competition’s goods.

Fear mongering is aimed particularly at those who do not pay particular attention to the election and make up their minds based on very limited information in the last few weeks or days of the campaign. They are seen as easily persuadable since they don’t really know what the truth is about an opponent’s statements or policies. Sometimes there is a legitimate case to be made. More often we are treated to exaggerations and in some cases to downright disinformation.

The NDP tried but failed to generate broad opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade agreement during the few days it had left, by stating how dangerous it would be for the dairy and auto industries, and by rejecting it outright. They also attempted to rekindle opposition to Liberal unethical practices by linking the LPC campaign co-chair Daniel Gagnier’s resignation, caught advising oil companies while still in that role, to the sponsorship scandal of 2004-05. A case of “same old, same old” they alleged. Finally, they reminded voters that previously, “Liberals campaigned from the left and governed from the right.” All were staged in the hope of regaining some votes on their left flank that they lost to the Liberals due primarily to their disastrous rejection of moderate stimulus spending and deficits at a time of economic stagnation, turning their backs in the process on 80 years of successful Keynesian economics.

However the wildest use of the tactic was by far taken up by the Conservatives throughout the campaign. The one sided fears included taxes, CPP & EU premiums, deficits, jobs, child benefits, refugees, niqabs, ISIL and terrorists, along with whichever party and leader was ahead of them, just to name those that come to mind, never pointing out what alternatives their rivals were proposing. At least many journalists were able to quickly point out how biased some of these statements and ads were and, hopefully, listeners were able to absorb the other side of the story and not be manipulated in such a grotesque way.

Arguably, the messaging coming from the Conservatives’ camp boiled down to, “No hope and no change,” and from the New Democrats’ camp, only “A little hope and a little change,” at least in the short term when many individuals and families were worried and hurting.

3. The Conservative Party of Canada: past, present, and future

To his credit, PM Harper began to eliminate from his ranks years ago the worst public manifestations of prejudice against identifiable groups. He also restrained or appeased the more social conservative elements within the party and made valiant efforts to speak French and appeal to Quebecers.

Fundamentally however, he and the heart of the present CPC remain staunchly blue- and white- collar neoconservatives, as opposed to more moderate (called “progressive” in this country) establishment conservatives that the Globe & Mail and others on the centre-right long for. Unfortunately, the Progressive Conservative Party (PCP) no longer exists; the Reform Party officially merged with it but in reality swallowed it whole. The Joe Clarks, Kim Campbells and Brian Mulroneys of Canada no longer have a party, in the same way that moderate conservatives in the U.S. have lost the Republican Part (the GOP) to a similar neoconservative movement comprised of different elements.

As outsiders, neoconservatives seem to be driven by a desire to change or “reform” pretty much everything in Ottawa and the country, and that includes institutions or the individuals within, and sometimes both (the Senate for example). As such, they are perhaps more revolutionary than conservatives, hence the World Affairs Journal article in 2012 title, “Reinventing Canada: Stephen Harper’s Conservative Revolution.”

Too often it looks like they or at least many of their leaders perceive anyone they encounter as being either with them or against them, be they judges, civil servants, journalists, scientists, civil society organizations, different levels of government within Canada, other countries, and multilateral institutions.

Some have tried to temperate it with some success after the PCP was dissolved, perhaps encouraging Mr. Harper to clampdown on irresponsible public statements and unpopular social wedge issues mentioned above. The base of the CPC however remains predominantly reformist, and a good segment of that base is already upset that many of the party’s original planks have been put aside, not least of which are grassroots democracy, transparency, institutional reform, and social policy.

PM Harper’s departure from the leadership may produce a less abrasive, more open, respectful and collaborative leader. That would certainly be welcomed. But going beyond that, to core policies and culture, that will take some doing. In order for that to happen, progressive conservatives would have to mount a major undertaking, sell a lot of membership cards and persuade the members to retain a more socially centrist, fiscally conservative brand of conservatism.

Failing that, they could found a new progressive conservative party. If anything our democracy has shown recently that it can withstand numerous major political parties and the electorate is able to make their own internal compromises, concentrate their votes on an alternative and elect a majority government. They did so in both 2011 and 2015.

Moreover, a new progressive conservative party may do well under an improved electoral system that may include some aspects of proportional representation and preferential balloting. They should certainly engage in the democratic and electoral reform consultative process promised by the incoming Liberal government and likely taken up by an all-party committee of the Parliament or other multi-partisan entity.

2. Making our democratic institutions whole again

Not to knock a man and his party members when they’re down, or at least not much further down. I just want to say a few things on issues larger than any of us, but that are nearly never top of mind when electors cast their ballots.

It was disheartening to see how much of their core vote Conservatives retained during these past few years right up and including voting day (31.6%), given their leaders thwarting of parliamentary democracy, the gagging of MPs, public servants and scientists, the attacks against the judiciary, the disrespect shown Governor General Michaëlle Jean, the hostility towards the Press Gallery, and the numerous scandals (PMO, Senate, etc.) and electoral scams, some bordering on illegality and some accidentally or purposely crossing over.

Perhaps their economic concerns or fears were so much more important that they were willing to overlook such undemocratic practices and precedents being set. Perhaps some new wedge issue such as the niqab kept them in the party’s column or they simply couldn’t stomach voting for “him”, yet felt a due to vote instead of abstain. Or perhaps they simply hoped to be able to bring about change from within after they won and the prime minister eventually left. Many conservatives inside and outside their ranks certainly weren’t happy, and expressed their displeasure as much over the years and the campaign itself.

You could also argue that many Liberals supporters still cast their ballots for their party in 2006 after the sponsorship scandal was exposed publicly. Yet I haven’t met one supporter that wasn’t profoundly upset and critical of what transpired.

I hope I am wrong but I suspect alas that many neoconservatives didn’t mind so much what their party was doing in their name, since it was done by their side for good reasons or they never believed the charges, or perhaps they believed they were confronted with all manner of opposition and obstacles, as mentioned above, and that the ends justify the means. There may even be a little of that also in all parties if one cares to admit it.

Means though are ends in the making. If you use such tactics to gain power, chances are you will use them to retain and advance your power. And then what kind of society have you created and left behind? We need to fix this through civic education, democratic reforms and amendments to the Accountability Act, for starters.

1. The majority of Canadians still prefer an honest, slightly-left government in office

Okay, it is easy to denigrate in such terms any party that forms a government with less than 50% of the votes, in this case the Tories since 2006. Yes, voters had every reason to sanction the Liberals in 2006 over the sponsorship scandal and, given there were no other centrist party at the time, had little choice but to settle for one or the other of the two remaining federal parties, in addition to the Bloc in Quebec. More citizens ended up picking Mr. Stephen Harper’s Conservatives than Mr. Jack Layton’s New Democrats, I would argue reluctantly, hoping that the defeat would straighten out and renew their historically favoured party so that they could support it anew within a few years at the most.

Unfortunately for a number of reasons, mostly tied to the harshly depicted and exaggerated flaws of the two subsequent Liberal leaders and some poorly constructed and strategically advanced policy proposals (ex. the carbon tax), they lost the following two elections as well in 2008 and 2011.

While the Libs could have hung onto their coalition in 2008-2009, the pressure coming from a great many Canadians dead set against it was immense, due to its shared and damaged leadership, the inclusion of the BQ with the balance of power, and especially the enormous public stress that accompanied the perception of political games in the middle of the worst collapse in world financial markets and the economy since the Great Depression, at least in the first few months. It was no surprise then, that when Mr. Michael Ignatieff was polling over 40% in February 2009, he and his colleagues dumped the coalition concept. More than a few regretted it afterwards I suspect.

All this changed when Mr. Justin Trudeau won the leadership of his party in 2013 and Canadians could again envisage him and his cohorts forming the next government. The majority were willing, as they did with previous leaders, to give him a chance to prove himself, and for some two years they held fast, even protecting him against unwanted attacks. The party stumbled over the last year but recovered spectacularly well from the very first news conference of the election campaign in Vancouver on August 2^nd.

While other fellow citizens will need to be convinced over the next four year, on Election Day 2015, 39.5% of Canadians finally had the leader, party and government they preferred once again: a strong, progressive, national, Liberal majority government.

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Robert M. David teaches at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Ottawa and was a federal Liberal candidate in 2009 and 2011.