The Heads of State and Heads of Government meeting at
the NATO Summit in Lisbon on Saturday took the decision to cease its combat
role in Afghanistan in 2014, if security permits, and provide military training
henceforth. Responsibility for security is to be passed on progressively to Afghan forces,
with complete control returned to the country by the end of that year,
according to the wishes of Afghan president Hamid Karzai. However, fundamental questions remain
unanswered:
1. Do the Afghan government, parliament
and civil society moderates really want
us there until 2014, given their growing complaints? It’s their hide if the
Taliban overtake the capital, so if they think they can hold the fort and do
better on their own, backed by our outside support, shouldn’t we pack up our
duffel bags?
2. Why are major European
countries, which arguably are more vulnerable to terrorist attack than Canada, not
willing to put up a proportional number of troops and take the fight to the
Taliban? Are they simply free riders or have they valid criticism of overall
strategy that we should heed?
3. Given that the next 911, if
any, can just as well be planned from Pakistan (where Bin Laden is operating),
Kashmir, Yemen, Somalia, Iran, or a flat in Bali, Madrid, or London, as other
terrorist attacks have, and that the most effective and immediate
counterterrorism measures are good intelligence and police work, as has also
been shown since 911, do we need to control the Afghan countryside from the
ground? Is it not sufficient to try to correctly identify terrorist training
camps and threats, wherever they are found, and deal with them more effectively
than in the past from the inside, using national forces, or the outside, using appropriate
means?
4. Is there a realistic chance
that this new military mission will be successful, given the present strategy,
government support levels, regional context, and timeline? And what is the
definition of that success? Is it “simply” local troops trained and motivated
enough to defend the government, keep Al-Qaeda out and stop the Taliban from
regaining power by force once we all leave? If more than that, what does it include
and who decides?
5. Is a negotiated settlement with
“moderate” Taliban needed to reach even this limited goal of a “good enough”
Afghanistan? Is that likely, are compromises necessary, and do we support it?
6. Why didn’t large-scale training
of Afghan troops begin at the outset? We had nine years to do so, yet we are still
sending Canadian recruits with only eight-months training to fight in Kandahar!
Note that after three decades of war against the Soviets and each other, our Afghans
allies know how to fight guerrilla war there better than most. The bigger
problem now lies in their split into pro and anti Karzai factions. How is the
government going to recruit, motivate, and retain sufficient soldiers in this
context? And will they respect the rights of prisoners and civilians after we
train them?
7. Democratization
using foreign military force has rarely succeeded in the past. Where it has
worked, as in Germany, Italy and Japan, it took millions of soldiers, trillions
of dollars, complete control of the country and neighbouring states, and
decades to accomplish – conditions not present nor apparently possible anymore.
Hence, is it not better to support democratic forces within countries from afar
and let citizens struggle for and implement their own democracy?
8. A final question that goes
beyond the singular Afghan case. Would Canada and its allies also achieve more
by putting greater resources into good governance, development and
peace-building strategies, rather than in additional military armament that has
proven less than effective in achieving such results, in countries and regions
of great concern?
If nothing else, we owe it to our troops, their families
and the Afghan people to discuss the options and get it right. A teaching
moment indeed.
Robert M. David teaches international development and globalization at the University of Ottawa and Concordia University.
Robert M. David teaches international development and globalization at the University of Ottawa and Concordia University.